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WILLIAM D. PETERSON, II, i 
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t Priority 2 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The instant action, an appeal from the conviction of a class 
C misdemeanor, comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court 
under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-2(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Can a criminal defendant bring a civil "countercomplaint" 
against the State of Utah in the criminal proceeding? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below as a matter 
of law, and the material facts are not in dispute. • Because this 
issue raises only questions of law, the Court should give the trial 
court's ruling no deference and review it under a correctness 
standard. City of Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co., 796 P.2d 697 
(Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are no statutes, rules, or constitutional provisions 
that are determinative of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The instant action is a criminal matter stemming from a 
traffic citation issued against the defendant, William D. Peterson. 
R. 2. The matter originated in a justice court, but venue was 
changed to the Fourth Circuit Court - Provo. R. 9, 11. The 
criminal trial was set for October 15, 1992 at 1:30 p.m. R. 10. 
Mr. Peterson filed what purported to be a civil 
"countercomplaint" against the State of Utah in his criminal 
action, and on several occasions submitted for decision to the 
circuit court his motions for default judgment in the 
"countercomplaint." R. 4-8. By a docket entry of September 21, 
1992, Judge McGuire indicated that he would not address the notice 
to submit for decision inasmuch as this was not a proper procedure 
in a criminal matter. R. 13. 
On the morning of October 15, 1992, Mr. Peterson filed a 
notice of appeal. R. 29. It was docketed that day with the entry 
"Notice of Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to Enter 
Default Filed by Def." On the afternoon of October 15, 1992, the 
instant criminal matter came on for trial in the Circuit Court. 
Mr. Peterson did not appear. After hearing the evidence, the trial 
judge found Mr. Peterson guilty of the Class C Misdemeanor of 
driving with an expired registration, and dismissed all of the 
civil pleadings that Peterson had sought to file in this criminal 
action. R. 27, 28. Another copy of Mr. Peterson's notice of 
appeal, still showing the date of October 15, 1992, was then 
entered on the docket a second time on October 20, 1992. R. 32. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The instant action is a criminal matter brought against 
Mr. William D. Peterson, II. Mr. Peterson was cited for driving a 
vehicle with an expired registration, a Class C Misdemeanor. R. 2. 
2. Mr. Peterson filed numerous documents purporting to bring 
a civil "countercomplaint" against the State of Utah in the instant 
criminal matter and seeking a default judgment against the State of 
Utah on this civil "countercomplaint." R. 4-8, 12, 14-17, 19-25, 
29-31, 34-36. In these documents, Mr. Peterson cites at least four 
prior civil and administrative proceedings where he has filed 
similar or identical civil counterclaims against the State of Utah. 
3. On the morning of October 15, 1992, Mr. Peterson filed his 
notice of appeal, before the trial of the instant matter. R. 29. 
4. The notice of appeal was docketed on October 15, 1992 with 
the entry "Notice of Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to 
Enter Default Filed by Def." A copy of this notice of appeal was 
then entered on the docket a second time on October 20, 1992 for an 
unknown reason. R. 32. 
5. On the afternoon of October 15, 1992 the criminal matter 
was tried before Judge McGuire. The defendant did not appear. 
After hearing the evidence, the court found the defendant guilty 
and assessed a forty dollar fine. R. 27, 28. No appeal has been 
taken from that decision. 
6. In his civil "counterclaim," Mr. Peterson claimed that in 
1985 he provided property to the State of Utah. R. 4 at 2. 
Peterson claimed that the State of Utah failed to pay him some 
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$6,200,000 that it owed him for the use of that property, which was 
equipment to be used in the removal of the VITRO tailings• R. 4 at 
2-3. Peterson alleged that he was a subcontractor under the Argee 
Corporation, which removed the VITRO tailings to Tooele County 
under a contract with the State of Utah. R. 4 at 3. 
7. Mr. Peterson also alleged that the State of Utah "failed 
to maintain filed defendant's filed corporate papers and over 
defendant's protest, plaintiff allowed intruders to register into 
defendants business." R. 4 at 3. Peterson sought a further 
$10,000,000 for damages to his family and corporation. 
8. Mr. Peterson's appeal does not challenge his conviction 
for driving a vehicle with an expired registration. • Instead, Mr. 
Peterson only appeals from the trial court's denial of Peterson's 
efforts to turn this criminal action into a civil proceeding in 
which Mr. Peterson could sue the State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT CANNOT BRING A CIVIL 
"COUOTERCOMPLAINT" IN THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING 
Mr. Peterson, a criminal defendant, sought to inject a civil 
cause of action for damages against the State of Utah into his 
criminal proceeding. In his appeal, Mr. Peterson does not 
challenge the propriety of his conviction. He does not claim that 
he was not guilty of driving without a valid registration. 
Instead, defendant Peterson appeals solely from the trial court's 
refusal to consider Mr. Peterson's civil "counterclaim" in this 
criminal proceeding. 
Civil and criminal matters cannot be brought in the same 
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proceeding. They are different actions that can not be tried or 
handled together. The trial court properly ignored Mr. Peterson's 
efforts. Mr. Peterson was free to file his civil complaint against 
the State of Utah as a separate lawsuit, and he has done so on 
several occasions. But Mr. Peterson cannot bring a civil claim for 
damages, either in tort or in contract, as a "counterclaim" in a 
criminal proceeding. 
A tort is not the same thing as a crime, 
although the two sometimes have many features 
in common. The distinction between them lies 
in the interests affected and the remedy 
afforded by the law. A crime is an offense 
against the public at large, for which the 
state, as the representative of the public, 
will bring proceedings in the form of a 
criminal prosecution. The purpose of such a 
proceeding is to protect and vindicate the 
interests of the public as a whole, by 
punishing the offender or eliminating him f^om 
society, either permanently or for a limited 
time, by reforming him or teaching him not to 
repeat the offense, and by deterring others 
from imitating him. A criminal prosecution is 
not concerned in any way with compensation of 
the injured individual against whom the crime 
is committed, and his only part in it is that 
of an accuser and a witness for the state. So 
far as the criminal law is concerned, he will 
leave the courtroom empty-handed. 
The civil action for a tort, on the other 
hand, is commenced and maintained by the 
injured person himself, and its purpose is to 
compensate him for the damage he has suffered, 
at the expense of the wrongdoer. If he is 
successful, he receives a judgment for a sum 
of money, which he may enforce by collecting 
it from the defendant. 
William L. Prosser, Law of Torts (4th Ed. 1971) § 2, at 7 
(footnotes omitted). Mr. Peterson's proposed "counterclaim," 
unlike the civil tort action considered by Prosser, does not even 
relate to the subject matter of the criminal prosecution. This is 
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not a victim's effort to join a tort action for the same occurrence 
with the criminal prosecution that stemmed from the tortious act. 
Mr. Peterson, a criminal defendant, sought in this action to raise 
an unrelated tort and contract action against the State of Utah. 
Plaintiff tries to offset, in some manner, his own culpability on 
a minor traffic violation with allegations that the State of Utah 
owes Mr. Peterson money in an eight-year-old dispute that has 
already been raised in prior civil proceedings. 
In as much as Mr. Peterson's appeal asks this Court to allow 
him to raise his civil claim (if any) against the State of Utah, it 
should be dismissed. There is no jurisdiction to hear a civil 
counterclaim in a criminal proceeding. 
In Hutchins v. Commonwealth, 604 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1992), the court rejected a criminal defendant's attempt to bring 
a civil counterclaim for due process violations, false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. 
Appellant's "counterclaim" sets forth a 
cause of action in trespass, which is a civil 
action governed by the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Appellant's appeal from his 
summary conviction requests a de novo review 
of his conviction for a summary criminal 
offense. The summary appeal is governed by 
the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
A civil trespass action and a summary 
appeal from a criminal conviction have no 
relationship in law or fact. The civil action 
seeks damages and would permit a jury trial. 
The appeal from the summary conviction is a de 
novo review of criminal complaint and permits 
a non-jury trial. 
. . . . 
Because a civil action cannot be joined 
to a criminal appeal, common pleas properly 
sustained Appellees' preliminary objections. 
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604 A.2d at 1130-31 (emphasis in original). Similarly, in 
Philadelphia v. Pennrose Management, 598 A.2d 105 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1991), the court affirmed the dismissal of a criminal cause of 
action that had been misjoined with various civil causes of action. 
Civil and criminal actions provide different types of due 
process and are governed by different rules of procedure. To 
permit the joinder of a civil action in a criminal proceeding would 
serve no useful purpose, but would needlessly complicate the 
administration of Utah's criminal law. 
In City of Independence v. Mickey, No. 54380, 1988 WL 112417 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988) the court held that under Ohio law a civil 
counterclaim could not be asserted in a criminal proceeding.1 In 
State v. Latendresse, 464 N.W.2d 205 (N.D. 1990) (Table),2 the 
court held that a criminal defendant's attempt to file a civil 
counterclaim in a criminal proceeding was completely without merit 
under North Dakota law. 
The problems inherent in permitting the filing of civil 
matters in criminal proceedings are also demonstrated by Mr. 
Peterson's claims against the county attorney who handled this 
matter before the trial court. Plaintiff alleges that the county 
attorney's prosecution of this criminal matter, and defense of the 
State of Utah from the filing of the attempted civil 
"counterclaim," somehow violated Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-30 (1992). 
1
 A complete copy of this decision is attached to this Brief 
in the Addendum. 
2
 The text of this opinion is attached to this Brief in the 
Addendum. 
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This statute only prohibits an attorney, and his partners, from 
being involved in both the prosecution and the defense of the same 
criminal proceeding. The statute does not, as plaintiff claims, 
preclude a government attorney from prosecuting Mr. Peterson on the 
one hand, and representing the government, as a defendant, in a 
civil matter brought by Mr. Peterson on the other. The statute 
would only be violated if Mr. Peterson could show that the county 
attorney had, at some point, assisted in Mr. Peterson's defense as 
well as prosecuting Mr. Peterson in the instant action. 
But Mr. Peterson's erroneous claim does illustrate another 
problem raised by plaintiff's attempt to file a civil 
"counterclaim" in this matter. In most criminal prosecutions, the 
State of Utah is represented by the county attorneys and their 
staffs in the trial court. If criminal defendants could file civil 
actions against the State of Utah in their criminal proceedings, 
Assistant Attorneys General, who represent the State of Utah in 
most civil matters, would need to participate. Thus the State of 
Utah would be represented by two separate sets of attorneys, one 
for the criminal and one for the civil matter. Many criminal 
defense attorneys might not have the experience to act as counsel 
for their clients as civil plaintiffs. Thus the criminal defendant 
could often also be represented by two separate sets of attorneys, 
one for the criminal and one for the civil matter. Jury 
instructions for both civil and criminal actions would have to be 
given. Even the burden of proof would be different, as well as the 
party who bears that burden of proof, between the criminal and the 
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civil matters. 
Clearly, the proper answer is that civil claims cannot be 
raised in criminal proceedings. The trial court correctly refused 
to let Mr. Peterson bring his civil claims in this criminal 
proceeding. The only question properly before the trial court was 
whether Mr. Peterson was guilty of driving a vehicle with an 
expired registration. The trial court's decision on that question 
has not been appealed. The trial court's dismissal of Mr. 
Peterson's civil "counterclaim" should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The instant appeal was not taken from Mr. Peterson's criminal 
conviction, but from the trial court's refusal to permit the 
criminal defendant to bring a civil "counterclaim" against the 
State of Utah in this criminal proceeding. The trial court 
correctly decided that civil claims cannot be interjected into a 
criminal action, and that decision should be affirmed by this 
Court. 
DATED this of April, 1993. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for the State of Utah 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH to the following this 
of April, 1993: 
William D. Peterson 
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Midvale, Utah 84047 
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ADDENDUM ' A ' 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT - PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF PROVO CITY 
vs 
PETERSON, WILLIAM D 









THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 41-1A-1303 DRIVE W/O REG/TITLE 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Bench 
Fine: 40.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 
Charge: DELINQUENT FEE DELINQUENT FEE 
Plea: Find: 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS: 
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS: 








PETERSON, WILLIAM D 
CASE NO: 9 2
» O O B 5 i a 
»*.o* 
DOCKET INFORMATION: 
Chrg: DRIVE W/o REG Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Be 
Fine Amount: 40.00 Suspended: .00 
Chrg: DELINQUENT FEE Plea: Find: 
EPM/BEN DAVIS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF. DEFENDANT FAILED TO APPEAR 
TRIAL IS HELD IN ABSENTIA. PATROLMAN PELTON, UHP, SWORN AND 
TESTIFIED. COUNTY RESTS. COURT FINDS DEFENDANT GUILTY AS 
CHARGED. DEFENDANT TO PAY $40 BY 11/15/92. ALL CIVIL MATTERS 
ARE TO BE DISMISSED. 
BY THE COURT 
JUDGE, CIRCUIT COUgT 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS 
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT. 
v / 
ADDENDUM ' B ' 
PAGE 1 
:ation Rank(R) Database Mode 
: Reported in N.E.2d R 7 OF 32 ALLSTATES P 
.te as: 1988 WL 112417 (Ohio App.)) 
IOTICE: RULE 2 OF THE OHIO SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE REPORTING OF OPINIONS 
IMPOSES RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. 
CITY OF INDEPENDENCE, et al., Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Daniel E. MICKEY, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 54380. 
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County. 
Sept. 22, 1988. 
Iriminal appeal from Garfield Heights Municipal Court Case No. 85-5373. 
itephen M. 0'Bryan, Law Director, Kelley, McCann & Livingstone, Cleveland, for 
aintiff-appellee. 
>aniel E. Mickey, pro se. 
JOURNAL ENTRY and OPINION 
[cMANAMON, Judge. 
1 Daniel E. Mickey appeals his conviction in the Garfield Heights 
nicipal court for storing his dump truck in a residential area. In a timely 
>peal, he raises seven assignments of error for our review. [FNl] Since none 
his arguments are meritorious, we affirm the judgment of the municipal 
urt. 
n October 1985 the city of Independence cited Mickey for storing a truck in 
cess of three-quarter-ton capacity in a residential area (Independence 
d.Ord. 1181.08), and for repairing the truck on the premises (Independence 
d.Ord. 1143.02). Mickey filed a "reply" and "cross-complaint" to these 
iminal charges entering denials and asserting civil counterclaims against the 
yor of Independence and its building commissioner. He posited a denial of 
s civil rights and infliction of emotional distress. Upon motion by the city 
e court ordered Mickey's responsive pleading stricken from the files, 
ickey filed a notice of appeal from this order on November 6, 1985, as well 
a second notice of appeal on December 2, 1985, from an order setting a bond 
d issuing a capias. We dismissed these appeals for lack of a final 
pealable order. 
lso on December 2, Mickey filed an affidavit of bias and prejudice against 
e municipal court judge. Although the record discloses that the judge 
ferred the affidavit to the presiding judge of the common pleas court, the 
cord is silent on the latter court's disposition of the matter, 
n remand the municipal court granted Mickey's motion to dismiss the count 
leging illegal repair of the vehicle, but found him guilty of storing it in a 
sidential area. 
ickey's first and third assignments contend, respectively, that the municipal 
art erred in striking his "answer and cross-complaint" and in refusing to 
rtify the case to common pleas court since his prayer for $100,000 exceeded 
e court's monetary jurisdictional limits. Mickey's fifth, sixth and seventh 
signments address the merits of his civil counterclaims. These arguments 
all be considered together. 
tie Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribe the procedure to be followed in 
iminal cases with certain exceptions not pertinent to this case. Crim.R. 
lot Reported in N.E.2d PAGE 2 
:ite as: 1988 WL 112417, *1 (Ohio App.)) 
(A); See, also, R.C. 1901.21(A). The rules do not authorize the assertion of 
i civil counterclaim in a criminal matter. See Crim.R. 12(A). Accordingly, 
hese assignments are overruled. 
Mickey's second assignment alleges the clerk of the municipal court refused to 
erve the city with a copy of his answer and counterclaim. Our holding that 
ickey's pleading was ineffectual is dispositive of this assignment. We note 
n passing, however, that responsive pleadings in civil cases are to be served 
y the party, not by the clerk of courts. Civ.R. 5(A) and (B). 
In his fourth assignment of error, Mickey contends that his affidavit of 
rejudice deprived the municipal court of the power to hear the action. Under 
he circumstances of this case, we disagree. 
The disqualification of municipal court judges is governed by R.C. 2937.20. 
he statute authorizes this remedy "[w]hen a magistrate or.a judge of a court 
nferior to the court of common pleas is interested in a cause pending before 
im, or is related to or has a bias or prejudice either for or against a party 
o such cause or to his counsel, or is otherwise disqualified to sit in such 
ause * * *." 
*2 The case against Mickey was not pending before the municipal court on 
he date Mickey filed the affidavit of prejudice. Mickey's November 6, 1985 
otice of appeal, filed nearly a month before his affidavit, terminated the 
ourt's jurisdiction. Dempsey v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (1985), 20 Ohio 
pp.3d 90, 94. As a practical matter, the court lacked the power at that point 
o do anything to Mickey's detriment. While Mickey's affidavit remained on 
ile when the case was remanded, we conclude it was incumbent upon him to bring 
he matter to the court's attention. Although Mickey actively contested the 
ase at every stage of the proceedings, the record does not reflect that he 
hallenged the judge's qualifications upon remand. Because Mickey has not 
rovided us with a transcript of the proceedings, we are unable to determine if 
s raised the subject at the hearing. 
Accordingly, this assignment of error is not well taken, and the judgment of 
he municipal court is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
DYKE and NAHRA, JJ., concur. 
N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio 
ales of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 
5). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to 
idicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of 
le court and time period for review will begin to run." 
APPENDIX 
I 
'The trial court erred in signing into judgment an order dismissing 
Pendant's answer and 'Cross-Complaint', Rule 13(A) (C), Exh. A-A, 1—A 2, B 2, 
3, B 4, B 5." 
II 
'Clerks [sic ] error in refusal to place a copy of the process and complaint 
: other document to be served in an envelope, etc., Rule 4.1-(A), Exh. (B 3 & 
4, 5 B)." 
Ill 
•Judge Stralka's error not to certify said case to the Cuyahoga County Ohio 
COPR. (C) WEST 1993 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
Dt Reported in N.E.2d PAGE 3 
Lte as: 1988 WL 112417, *2 (Ohio App.)) 
Dmmon Pleas Court, O.R.C. Sec. 1901.22(E) refusal of due process to appellant 
irray v. Hoboken Land Co., 59 U.S. (18 How) 272, 15 Led 372 is by the Law 
t the Land 'Magna Carta'." 
IV 
'Judge Stralka's error in activities which fell within the scope of Wendel v. 
lghes, 64 Ohio App. Affidavit in Bias and Prejudice, filed by App. Dec. 2, ' 
>, in his (judge) ordering excessive bond, bail and cruel punishment violating 
j Civil Rights Amend. Art. VII & VIII (Exh. B-B 1, C, E, F.)" 
V 
'Indep. Police Officers erred in creating false alarms Code 648.09 Indep. 
Sxh. T) & Falsification Code 2921.13 (Exh. IV and Exh. Q-Q 1, R-R 1, S 
iterfering with my Civil Rights Indep. Code 636.08. Police erred in violating 
:d. Codes Indep. 1181.08, 339.10, 1143.02, (Exh. O-P-V-V 1) Also 
.8.01(A)(C)(F) Exh. Affidavit (L) Exh. W-W 1)." 
VI 
'Mayor W. Wisniski, (retired) was in knowledge of 'Cross-Complaint' 'Hand 
slivered' and in knowledge of Delinquent Officers, who's [sic ] error [sic ] 
>w is Mayor Kurts Elect Jan. '86 Indep. 0. also with knowledge of same should 
»rfer [sic ] charges against delinquent officers. Municipal Corps., Code 
13.35 and has general supervision over each department and the officers 
-ovided for in Title VII of the O.R.C. and is in violation of this Code (Exh. 
>. # I)." 
VII 
3 "Chief of Police in error (City of Indep.) and in knowledge of this 
Iross-Complaint" and harassment by his men and is responsible for the 
ipervision and training of Police Dept. in the preservation of pease [sic ] 
id dignity of the City of Indep., for the protection of property and for 
iforcement of all laws and ordinances and constitutions, statuates [sic ] and 
w of the United States and State of Ohio. Under Perjury 2921.11(A) no 
xson, in any official proceeding, shall knowingly make a false statement 
der oath or affirmation, or swear or affirm the truth of a false statement, 
en statement is material, and in error of ordering excessive Bond, Bail and 
uel punishment, Amend. Art. VIII, (Exh. C-E-S-III)." 
FN1. See Appendix. 
OF DOCUMENT 
COPR. (C) WEST 1993 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
ADDENDUM ' C 
PAGE 1 
:ation Rank(R) Database Mode 
\ N.W.2d 205 (Table) R 3 OF 32 ALLSTATES P 
ipublished Disposition 
Lte as: 464 N.W.2d 205) 
NOTICE: "SUMMARY DISPOSITION, SEE NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE, RULE 35.1(a)." 
NOTE: THIS OPINION WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN A PRINTED VOLUME. THE 
DECISION WILL APPEAR IN TABLES PUBLISHED PERIODICALLY. 
STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee 
v. 
Orville LATENDRESSE, Defendant and Appellant 
Civil No. 900218. 
Supreme Court of North Dakota. 
Nov. 29, 1990. 
appeal from the Ward County Court, Northwest Judicial District, the Honorable 
.lliam W. McLees, Judge. 
)rville Latendresse, pro se. 
rohn P. Van Grinsven III, Assistant State's Attorney, Minot, for plaintiff and 
>pellee. 
:ounty Court, Ward County. 
AFFIRMED. 
(The decision of the Court is referenced in the North Western 
Reporter in a table captioned "Supreme Court of North Dakota 
Affirmances by Summary Opinion.") 
(THE FOLLOWING UNREPORTED DECISION IS REPRODUCED FOR-THE 
CONVENIENCE OF RESEARCHERS. ADD THE NOTATION: (text in WESTLAW) TO 
ANY CITATION OF THIS DECISION.) 
rANDE WALLE, Justice. 
)rville Latendresse appealed from a Ward County Court judgment of 
mviction. Latendresse was charged with and convicted of the misdemeanor 
fense of issuing a bank check without sufficient funds. On appeal, 
itendresse raises several defenses including: the fact that he was not given 
•oper notice of dishonor, the fact that restitution was made prior to trial, 
id the fact that the State of North Dakota has caused his financial 
tortfall. Our decision in State v. Latendresse, 459 N.W.2d 234 (N.D.1990), 
dispositive of these defenses, 
•atendresse appears to raise two additional arguments on appeal. First, 
tendresse apparently argues that criminal penalties for issuing a check 
thout sufficient funds are prohibited because section 6-18-16, NDCC, makes 
ference to both civil and criminal penalties. Second, Latendresse apparently 
gues that the trial court improperly denied his civil "counterclaim" brought 
ainst the State in this criminal proceeding. We deem these arguments to be 
mpletely without merit. 
he judgment of conviction is affirmed pursuant to Rule 35.1(a)(1) and (7), 
rth Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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